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Abstract
We consider a standard model of consumer switching costs with demand uncertainty
where rms observe private information about demand. Given this private information, each
rm forms beliefs over dierent demand realizations as well as beliefs over the other rm's
information. The main result here is that in the rst period, if rms observe information
suggesting that future demand is likely to be high, they will price aggressively, sacricing
current prots for higher market share and the expectation of higher future prots.
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There has recently been a substantial literature on consumer switching costs and their appli-
cations. Examples of innite horizon models include Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Farrell and
Shapiro (1988), Klemperer (1987), To (1996) and von Weizsacker (1984). Switching costs have
been applied to consider price wars (Klemperer (1989)) and countercyclical pricing in macroe-
conomics (Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995)) and recently, there has been a growing literature
which examines international trade policy under consumer switching costs (Greaney (1997),
Hartigan (1996) and To (1994, 1998)).
The standard switching cost models have a number of problems. One problem is that price
wars and dumping phenomena are purely rst period eects or a result of the entry of new
consumers. In general, one would expect that such activities do not happen only in new markets
or with the inux of a large number of new consumers but that price wars or dumping occurs
repeatedly as rms strike a balance between current prots and market share based on changing
market conditions. Second, as long as rms have symmetric information, even if random cost
or demand shocks are introduced into the model, in the long run, market shares will converge
to a steady state.
We consider the setting in which rms observe noisy, private signals of demand (perhaps
the result of market research). Each rm's private information is correlated with the private
information of rival rms and thus rms not only update their own beliefs over demand but they
also update their beliefs over the information observed by rival rms. Firms then choose prices
given these beliefs. In our model, consumers who purchase from one producer in the rst period
are `locked in' so that when a rm observes a signal which suggests that future demand is high,
that rm will price aggressively in the hopes of capturing market share. These results suggest
that price wars are initiated when both rms anticipate relatively high future demand, in the
hopes of establishing a dominant market position. In addition, the fact that prices are a result
of privately observed information implies that in a fully dynamic model, market shares would
shift back and forth over time as rms seek to take advantage of privately observed information.2 The Model
In each of two periods t = 1;2 each rm, i = A;B, simultaneously chooses a price, pi
t. Given
these prices, consumers purchase from one of the two rms. Firms and consumers have discount
factors F and C.
Each of the two rms produces a spatially dierentiated product. Firms have no xed costs
and have identical marginal costs which have been normalized to zero. Firms A and B are
respectively located at 0 and 1. Firms maximize discounted expected prots.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] and incur a transportation cost
of one per unit of distance. In each period, consumers have a reservation value of R and
inelastically demand a single unit of the good, produced by either rm. We further assume that
once a consumer has purchased from one supplier, it is too costly to switch to another supplier.
At the end of period 1, mass  2 (0;1] of uniformly and randomly chosen consumers leave the
market and are replaced by new consumers. A consumer that leaves the market in the second
period does not incur any costs and gets a second-period payo of zero. Consumers minimize
discounted expected price and transportation costs.
Total demand in each period is given by t. In the rst period, 1 is known with certainty;
in the second period, demand is given by 2 2 fH;Lg with H > L. Let the probability that
second period demand is high be given by  and the probability that demand is low be given
by 1   . Assume that in the rst period, prior to making their rst period pricing decision,
each rm observes an independent, noisy signal of second period demand. If the actual state is
H then rms observe an H with probability H and if the actual state is L then rms observe
an H with probability L where H > L. Let the signal that rm i receives be denoted by
Si 2 fH;Lg.
2.1 Updating Beliefs
Probabilities , H and L are common knowledge to both rms and thus form the basis for
their prior and posterior beliefs. Upon observing signal s 2 fH;Lg, using Bayes rule, we see








(1   H) + (1   )(1   L)
: (1)
2where 
s is dened as the probability that 2 = H conditional on having observed Si = s.
Now, given signal Si, rm i believes that rm j observed Sj = H with probability 
s =
P(Sj = HjSi = s). These probabilities are given by:

H = 
HH + (1   
H)L 
L = 
LH + (1   
L)L: (2)
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(1   H) + (1   )(1   L)
(3)
where s0s00
s = P( = s0;Sj = s00jSi = s).
With these preliminaries aside, we now turn to solving the model. As is usual for sub-game
perfect equilibria, we begin in the second period.
3 The Second Period
In the second period, consumers minimize their second period costs given that they are either
locked into some producer or that they are new consumers with no previous ties.
Let x = 1=2 + (pB
2   pA
2 )=2. New consumer x buys from rm A if x < x and from B
otherwise. All old consumers buy from the same producer provided that pi
2 + qi
1  R. Thus
when jpB
2  pA
































1   1) (6)









1   1) (7)













4 The First Period
Consumers must decide which rm to purchase from, anticipating the outcome in the second
period and knowing that if they are still in the market in the second period, they are `locked-in.'
Let x be the consumer that is indierent between purchasing from rm A and from rm
B.
pA
1 + x + C(1   )(pA
2 + x) = pB
1 + (1   x) + C(1   )(pB
2 + (1   x)) (9)
Firm A's rst period output is qA
1 = x and B's is qB
1 = 1   x. Substituting qA
1 for x and
(6) for pi
2, we solve (9) for A's rst period demand qA










where  = 3=2(3 + C(1   )( + 2)).
Given signal Si, rm i maximizes expected discounted prots through choice of rst period






























2 is as given in (8).
Letting  = 2(1 )=3 and  2s = E[2], the rst-order condition for the rm's rst period










  F 2s + F2 2spi
1s   F2Es[2sp
j
1] = 0 (13)
The second-order conditions for prot maximization requires that
21 > F2 2s (14)
Solving (13) for pi





1]   F 2s   F2Es[2p
j
1]
21   F2 2s
(15)
Given rm i's beliefs over the information of rm j, we can write rm i expectation over the










1s0 is rm j's rst period
price contingent on having observed information Sj = s0 and rm i, having observed Si = s,
believes with probability 
s that rm j observed Sj = H. Similarly, using the conditional
joint probability distribution of  and Sj (i.e., s0s00
s ), Es[p
j












Equation (15) must be satised for i = A;B, j 6= i, and si = H;L and thus the equilibrium
signal contingent prices are given by the solution to a system of four equations in four unknowns.
Since marginal costs are the same for each rm, we must have pi
1s = p
j
1s = p1s for s = H;L, and












1   2F 2H
2DH



























where 1 = 1
H   F2(HH
H H + LH
H L), 2 = 1(1   
H)   F2(HL




L H + LH
L L), 4 = 1(1   
L)   F2(HL
L H + LL
L L), and Ds =
21   F2 2s > 0.
This can be rearranged and then solved using Cramer's Rule and has solution
p1H =



































where D = ((DH   1)(DL   4)   23]=DHDL.
Proposition 1 For any admissible parameters, p1H < p1L.
Proof: Calculate p1H   p1L.
p1H   p1L =

1   2 2H
2DH






1   2 2L
2DL

DH   1   2
DH

(DH   1)(DL   4)   23
DHDL
=
(1   2F 2H)(DL   4   3)   (1   2F 2L)(DH   1   2)
2[(DH   1)(DL   4)   23)]
(19)
First, it can be shown that the numerator is strictly positive for any admissible parameter
values. Note that 1+2 = 1 F2 2H and 3+4 = 1 F2 2L then DH  (1+2) =
1, and DL  (3 +4) = 1. It is straightforward to see that (1  2F 2H)(DL  4  3) 
(1   2F 2L)(DH   1   2) =  2F1( 2H    2L) < 0. It remains to be shown that for
any combination of parameters, which satisfy the second-order conditions, that (DH  1)(DL 
4)   23 > 0. Expanding the above results in DHDL   DH4   DL1 + 41   23. After
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(1   )(H   L)[HL(H   L) + (HH   LL)(H + (1   )L)]
[H + (1   )L]2[(1   H) + (1   )(1   L)]
(20)
Since H > L and H > L, this is always positive. Therefore p1H < p1L.
6In other words, when rms observe information suggesting that second-period demand is
going to be high, they price more aggressively than when they observe a signal of low future
demand. Price wars are now predicted as a coincidence of privately observed information (i.e.,
when both rms observe signal H). This occurs with positive probability (i.e., 2
H +(1 )(1 
L)2). Depending on the parameters, this can explain the relative frequency with which price
wars are sometimes observed. In a fully dynamic model, one would thus expect that price wars
under consumer switching costs do not always need to occur at the inception of a new market
or with a large inux of fresh consumers.
Furthermore, since equilibrium prices are contingent on privately observed information, so
that even though ex ante both rms are symmetric, ex post they behave dierently with positive
probability (i.e., 2(H(1   H) + (1   )L(1   L))). Again in a fully dynamic setting, one
would expect that prices and market shares would not typically converge to a steady state.
5 Concluding Remarks
We introduce asymmetric private information into a standard consumer switching cost model
in order to provide a plausible framework under which price wars can arise as an ongoing
phenomenon, rather than as a rst period result as predicted by typical models of consumer
switching costs. Although the present model is not fully satisfactory for this purpose, it repre-
sents a step in the right direction. To be more satisfactory, one would want to look at a model
with a longer time horizon. Unfortunately, fully dynamic models without private information
are already quite complicated (e.g., Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and To (1996)). With currently
available methods, fully dynamic models with private information are intractable. A simpler
model with pseudo-dynamics1 can be solved, however, the solution is algebraically meaning-
less. Numerical simulations do however indicate that similar results pertain, conrming our
conjectures.
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